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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EXCELSIOR IRON MINING COM- « 
PANY, a corporation, and UTAH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM and i 
ROBERT GORLINSKI, I 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, , 
Cross-Plaintiff and Appellant) 
vs. 
EXCELSIOR IRON MINING COM-
PANY, a corporation, and UTAH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Cross-Defendants and Appellees.j 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES 
This case involves the title to certain land in Iron 
Springs Mining District, Iron County, Utah. Prior to the 
commencement of this case title to the land here involved 
was three times made the subject of litigation in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah. 
In all three cases the judgment of the federal court con-
firmed title to the land in respondents' predecessors in 
Case No. 
7825 
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interest. In the last of those cases the exact contentions 
made here by appellants were expressly rejected by the 
court. The decisions of the federal court will be dis-
cussed in detail later in this brief. 
A. 
HISTORY OF PROPERTY INVOLVED 
Appellants have devoted the first 26 pages of their 
brief to what is designated as a statement of facts. Most 
of the essential facts are not in dispute. Such facts as 
appellants rely upon to support their argument, and as to 
which there is dispute, will be specifically referred to 
hereinafter. To give continuity and proper sequence to 
our argument we will be under the necessity of restating 
those facts which dominate the case and which, we urge, 
compel an affirmance of the trial court's judgment and 
decree. 
A-l 
ARMSTRONG PATENT CONVEYED ENTIRE SURFACE 
OF CONFLICT AREA. 
Prior to October 4,1871, the Southeast Quarter of the 
Northwest Quarter of Section 32, T. 35 S, E 12 W., 
SLBM, was open and unoccupied public domain subject 
to location and appropriation pursuant to applicable min-
ing laws. It is with that quarter section that we are here 
dealing. Then, as now, if a citizen discovered mineral 
upon the open and unoccupied public domain he could 
locate a claim or claims thereon and thereby appropriate 
the same to his own use and ownership. If the mineral 
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so discovered was within rock in place it was subject to 
location only as a lode or vein. If the mineral was con-
tained within the surface material and not a part of rock 
in place it was subject to location only as a placer claim. 
If locations were validly made and all the preliminary 
steps taken prerequisite to United States Patent, a patent 
would issue upon proper application, and a charge would 
be made for placer ground at the rate of $2.50 an acre, 
and for a vein or lode at the rate of $5.00 an acre. 
On October 4, 1871, Blair, Smith and Adams made a 
valid placer location upon all of the quarter section above 
described. (Ex. B to Stipulation, Field Notes) The effect 
of that location was to segregate the quarter section from 
the public domain and subject it to all of the rights of the 
locators. Soon after perfecting the location the lo-
cators sold the claim to Joseph H. Armstrong, and the 
claim at all times since then has been known and referred 
to as the Armstrong Placer. 
In 1872 preliminary steps, including an agreement 
for survey, were taken toward carrying the location of 
the Armstrong Placer to patent. (Ex. B to Stipulation, 
Field Notes) The location of the Armstrong Placer would 
have clearly entitled the locators and their successors in 
interest to a United States patent covering the entire 
quarter section including all of the surface and all of the 
ores and minerals beneath the surface except for the fact 
that there existed within the placer claim a "known lode 
or vein" of iron ore. The lode or vein was known to exist 
because it outcropped so conspicuously above the sur-
rounding surface that it could be seen for many miles. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The existence of the known lode referred to is of critical 
and dominating importance in this case. 
Armstrong desired to and was entitled to receive a 
United States patent for all of the surface within his 
location as placer ground, and for all of the known lode 
or vein as such. By reason of the existence of the known 
lode or vein within his placer claim Armstrong's applica-
tion for patent was required to conform to Revised Stat-
ute 2333, Title 30, Section 37, United States Code Anno-
tated, if he expected to acquire title to the known lode or 
vein, or any part thereof. Because the statute just cited 
controlled the situation in which Armstrong found him-
self, and because it dominates and controls the rights of 
the parties to this case, we here set it forth : 
"Where the same person, association, or cor-
poration is in possession of a placer claim, and 
also a vein or lode included within the boundaries 
thereof, application shall be made for a patent for 
the placer claim, with the statement that it in-
cludes such vein or lode, and in such case a patent 
shall issue for the placer claim, subject to the pro-
visions of sections 21-24, 26-30, 33-48, 50-52, 71-76 
of this title, including such vein or lode, upon the 
payment of $5 per acre for such vein or lode claim, 
and twenty-five feet of surface on each side there-
of. The remainder of the placer claim, or any 
placer claim not embracing any vein or lode claim, 
shall be paid for at the rate of $2.50 per acre, to-
gether with all costs of proceedings; and where a 
vein or lode, such as is described in section 23 of 
this title, is known to exist within the boundaries 
of a placer claim, and application for a patent for 
such placer claim which does not include an appli-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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cation for the vein or lode claim shall be construed 
as a conclusive declaration that the claimant of the 
placer claim has no right of possession of the vein 
or lode claim; but where the existence of a vein or 
lode in a placer claim is not known, a patent for the 
placer claim shall convey all valuable mineral and 
other deposits within the boundaries thereof." 
Following the foregoing section as it appears in 
U.S.C.A. there is a note by the annotator which reads: 
"This section (Title 30, Sec. 37, U.S.C.A.) 
is not in conflict with Section 23 of this title but 
is intended to refer to lode claims found only with-
in the limits of a placer location, while Section 23 
of this title refers to lode locations generally, ex-
clusive of those within the limits of a placer claim. 
Mt. Eosa Min. etc. Co. v. Palmer, 56 Pac. 176." 
(U.S.C.A. Title 30, Sec. 37, p 325) 
The controlling importance of the distinction noted 
above will become clear as the full history of the property 
is revealed. 
Application for patent was filed by Armstrong in 
1874. (Ex. B to Stipulation, Field Notes) At that time he 
knew of the existence of the lode or vein, and he knew 
that if his application for patent to the Armstrong Placer 
did not include an application for the vein or lode his 
application would be construed as a conclusive declaration 
that he had no right or interest in the vein or lode. (Title 
30, Sec. 37 U.S.C.A.) Accordingly, in his application for 
patent Armstrong described the area claimed as placer 
ground and attempted to describe an area which embraced 
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all of the vein or lode throughout its length to the south 
boundary of his placer claim which was the south line of 
the southeast quarter of the northwest quarter of section 
32. (See field notes attached to stipulation and map made 
part of patent, finding No. 1.) His application described 
the vein or lode by metes and bounds, and after survey 
by the Suveyor General the application for patent was 
granted. In the meantime Walker and Blair succeeded 
to the rights of Armstrong and they were named as 
patentees in the United States patent which issued on the 
16th day of December 1879. (PP. 1-3 Ex. AA, Abstract) 
In the application for patent the placer ground was 
referred to as the Armstrong Placer and the lode or vein 
as the Armstrong Iron Mine. The Armstrong Iron Mine 
was given lot no. 41 by the surveyor, and the patent de-
scribes the iron mine granted to the patentee as the "Arm-
strong Iron Mine, Lot 41." The issuance of the patent 
to Walker and Blair raised a conclusive presumption that 
the location was valid and that all things required by law 
prior to patent had been done. (Lindley on Mines, 3rd Ed., 
Vol. 3, Sec. 777 p. 1891) 
Upon receipt of the United States patent covering 
the Armstrong Placer and the Armstrong Iron Mine, 
Lot 41, Walker and Blair became the owners of all the 
land described in, and granted by thejpatent, and it was 
stipulated in this case that SppSKSS^ Excelsior Iron 
Mining Company, has succeeded to all of the rights and 
interests conveyed by the United States patent to Walker 
and Blair. (Tr. 22 et seq.) 
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The trial court included a copy of the patent in its 
finding No. 1. Keference to that patent will disclose that 
there is attached to and made a part thereof a map show-
ing the extent and location of the Armstrong Iron Mine, 
Lot 41, as it lay within the confines of the Armstrong 
Placer. The map will also disclose that the land conveyed 
as placer ground includes all of the quarter section except 
that embraced within the Armstrong lode, Lot 41. The 
map shows Lot 41 as extending from its north end line to 
the south line of the Armstrong Placer, which in turn is 
the south line of the quarter section. 
In his finding No. 17 the trial court found that it was 
the intention of the parties to the Armstrong patent that 
the Armstrong Iron Mine, Lot 41, should include all the 
area shown as Lot 41 upon the map attached to the 
patent, "but because of an error in the survey which at-
tempted to establish the south boundary of the southwest 
quarter of the northwest quarter of section 32, the ground 
in controversy was not covered by the metes and bounds 
description of the Armstrong Mine, Lot 41, and therefore, 
by inadvertence, the conflict area was not described in 
the United States patent as a part of the Armstrong Mine, 
Lot 41." 
From the granting of the Armstrong patent in De-
cember 1879, until the year 1902, no one ever challenged 
the correctness of the descriptions shown upon the map 
in the Armstrong Patent, and the patentees assumed that 
their lode location extended from its north boundary to 
the quarter section line. 
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We remind the court in this connection that by force 
of Eevised Statute 2333 quoted above that inasmuch as 
the existence of the entire Armstrong Lode was known 
at the time of the application for patent, if any part of 
it was not described in the application for patent then 
the part not described was segregated from the land 
claimed by the applicant for patent and continued to be 
subject to location, even though in conflict with the sur-
face rights of the placer claim. 
A-2 
JONES LOCATION COVERED ENTIRE LODE WITHIN 
CONFLICT AREA, AND PATENT COVERED ENTIRE LODE 
AND 50 FEET UPON SURFACE. 
In 1902 Thomas J. Jones located the Cora No. 1, 
amended, lode claim. (Ex. AA p. 13) In connection with 
his location he caused a survey to be made and the sur-
veyor concluded that the metes and bounds description 
of the lode claim contained in Armstrong's application for 
patent, and in the patent itself was such that the Arm-
strong Iron Mine, Lot 41, failed to extend to the south 
line of the Armstrong Placer by a distance of approxi-
mately 135 feet. If that were true then the south 135 feet 
of the Armstrong Lode, as distinguished from the surface, 
was not covered by the application or the patent. The 
effect of such omission was that the 135 feet involved was 
covered only by the placer patent, and the lode beneath 
continued to be subject to lode location. Jones, believing 
that the south 135 feet of the Armstrong Lode had not 
been covered by the patent embraced that area within his 
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location of the Cora. The boundaries marked off and de-
scribed in his location of the Cora, covered an area ap-
proximately 135 feet north and south along the Arm-
strong vein or lode and 600 feet east and west. That area 
lay within the limits of the Armstrong Placer and covered 
the south 135 feet of the Armstrong Mine. (See Ex. AA 
pp. 13, 14 and Ex. B to Stipulation Tr. 42 et seq.) 
As stated above, up until the Jones location, Arm-
strong and his successors in interest had assumed that 
their patent covered all of the Armstrong vein or lode to 
and including the south boundary of the placer claim. 
The location of the Cora No. 1 encroached to the extent 
of 135 feet by 600 feet upon the area embraced within the 
Armstrong Placer. This encroachment created a conflict 
and the area so encroached upon became a conflict area 
as that term is used by miners, and was referred to 
thoughout the trial of this case as the "conflict area." 
By 1902 the Excelsior Iron Mining Company of Wy-
oming became successor in interest to Walker and Blair, 
and as such became the owners of the Armstrong Placer 
and the Armstrong Iron Mine. 
It is a rule of mining law from which we have never 
seen any dissent that the valid location of a mining claim 
serves to segregate the area described in the location 
from the public domain. It gives to the locator the equi-
valent of a fee simple title against all the world except 
the United States Government, and gives to the locator 
the right to acquire the title remaining in the government 
if he performs the acts prerequisite to the issuance of a 
patent. This general rule is subject to the requirement 
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that the location must be made upon a lode or vein which 
is open to location. (Lindley on Mines, 3rd Ed., Vol. 2, 
Sec. 322, p. 733) 
A-3 
FEDERAL COURT TWICE QUIETED TITLE TO ENTIRE 
CONFLICT AREA IN JONES BASED UPON CORA LOCA-
TION. 
In 1904, Excelsior brought suit in the Circuit Court 
of the United States for the District of Utah for the pur-
pose of quieting title as against Jones to the entire con-
flict area. At that time Jones' right rested entirely upon 
his location of the Cora claim. He had not then applied 
for nor received any patent. After a hearing the federal 
court, Judge John A. Marshall sitting, decreed that Jones' 
location upon the entire conflict area, being approximate-
ly 135 feet north and south by 600 feet east and west, was 
a valid location, and quieted title in Jones and against 
Excelsior. A subsequent suit was filed in the federal 
court in 1906 wherein Excelsior again sought to quiet title 
in the conflict area against all of the claims asserted by 
Jones. A trial of that case was begun and during the 
trial a stipulation was entered upon as the result of which 
Judge Marshall again quieted title to the entire conflict 
area in Jones. In the course of his opinion Judge Mar-
shall in harmony with all the law upon the subject, ruled 
that by his location upon the conflict area Jones had ac-
quired the right to the entire lode within the area, but 
would be entitled to receive patent for only 50 feet upon 
the surface. The stipulation made in connection with the 
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decree contained an agreement by the parties to the liti-
gation that Jones might proceed to patent the conflict 
area without any protest or "adverse" by Excelsior, and 
that upon the procuring of patent he would deed the con-
flict area to Excelsior for a stipulated sum which Excel-
sior agreed to pay. (Ex. S) Accordingly, Jones made 
his application for patent to the Cora No. 1. The appli-
cation included the entire conflict area—135 feet by 600 
feet. The survey made in connection with the application 
for patent disclosed the existence of the conflict. The 
Land Office therefore rejected the application for patent 
upon the ground that the lode location being within the 
confines of a prior placer patent, the lode locator was 
entitled to the lode and only 50 feet of the surface along 
the vein. Jones then amended his application to include 
only 50 feet upon the surface of that portion of his claim 
which lay within the conflict area. The 50 feet upon the 
surface described in his amended application included his 
discovery. Such inclusion was altogether necessary be-
cause all subsequent rights of any lode locator depend 
upon an initial discovery of ore in place. 
In response to the amended application the United 
States issued its patent to Jones covering the Cora No. 
1, amended, but limited the surface granted within the 
conflict area to 50 feet in width. (Tr. 26, 27, 28) This 
limitation, we urge, was solely a limitation upon the 
surface and did not limit the lode or vein which was 
granted to Jones. Such limitation of the surface rights 
was required by command of Section 2333 Revised Stat-
utes which is quoted on page 4 above. 
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A-4 
FEDERAL COURT ADJUDGED JONES PATENT 
GRANTED ENTIRE LODE IN CONFLICT AREA. 
After receiving his patent Jones sold all interest ac-
quired thereby and all interest in the contract entered 
into between him and Excelsior during the trial of the 
case before Judge Marshall, to Colorado Fuel and Iron 
Company. Colorado Fuel and Iron Company then ten-
dered deed to that portion of the Cora lying within the 
conflict area and demanded payment of the purchase 
price by, Excelsior Iron Mining Company. 
Excelsior rejected the tendered deed and refused to 
make payment of the stipulated purchase price upon the 
ground that the deed did not convey all that was bar-
gained for. Specifically, Excelsior claimed that because 
the patent to Jones described only 50 feet in width upon 
the surface, the patent did not convey all of the iron 
lode lying within the conflict area. 
Suit was brought in the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah, by Colorado Fuel and Iron Com-
pany against Excelsior to enforce acceptance of the prof-
fered deed and the payment of the purchase price there-
for. 
In preparation for the defense of the case Excelsior 
employed Eobert Grorlinski, one of the appellants herein 
and the principal witness in this case, to investigate the 
lands involved including the ore bodies and their location, 
and the surveys made in connection therewith. As an em-
ployee of Excelsior, Gorlinski made an investigation of 
the properties and reported his findings and opinions to 
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Excelsior. (Ex. Y, Z) Excelsior filed its answer in the 
federal court action alleging it was not required to accept 
and pay for the deed tendered because the United States 
patent coveyed only 50 feet in width across the conflict 
area; that the 50 feet conveyed was not upon the apex 
of the vein, and that the portion of the conflict area lying 
outside of the 50 foot strip would continue to be public 
domain open to lode location. (Ex. W) 
The case came on for trial in 1918 before Judge Till-
man D. Johnson, and to support its defense Excelsior pro-
duced Eobert Gorlinski as its chief witness. The issue 
presented to and tried by the federal court was whether 
the patent to Jones conveyed all of the lode lying within 
the conflict area. If it did, then Excelsior must accept 
the proffered deed and pay the price stipulated there-
for. If it did not, then Excelsior was not required to ac-
cept the deed nor pay the purchase price. After a trial of 
the issues the federal court ruled and decided that while 
the patent described only 50 feet in width upon the sur-
face, it, nevertheless, conveyed all of the iron lode within 
the conflict area; that Jones became the owner of the en-
tire lode with the right to sell the same, and in effect that 
after patent no part of the conflict area was subject to 
lode location but was the property of Jones and his suc-
cessors in interest. Excelsior was therefore ordered to 
and did accept the proffered deed and pay the purchase 
price therefor. (Ex. X) 
The contentions made by Gorlinski in the federal 
court case just described, and those made by him in the 
court below, are, by Gorlinski's admission, identical. (Tr. 
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273) The issues before Judge Johnson and those before 
Judge Hoyt below are identical. (Ex. X and W) They 
involved the same land and the same patent, and the same 
testimony and contentions by Gorlinski. The United 
States Government by its executive department made a 
grant of land by patent to Jones, and by its judicial de-
partment it declared and adjudged what was conveyed 
by the patent. Excelsior accepted and recorded the deed 
from Colorado Fuel and Iron, and Excelsior took a deed 
from Jones and his wife, conveying the entire conflict 
area. Excelsior Iron Mining Company, a corporation of 
Wyoming, and its successors, including respondent, Ex-
celsior Iron Mining Company, a corporation of Utah, 
have at all times since paid the taxes levied and assessed 
upon the conflict area. (Tr. 167) By stipulation of the 
parties, and by the findings of the court below, respond-
ent became and is the owner of all the property conveyed 
by United States Patent to Walker and Blair, and to 
Thomas J. Jones. (Tr. 26, 28, 29, 30) 
A copy of Judge Johnson's decree is set forth at this 
point first as a statement of authority in support of our 
contention, and second to show the identity of the issues 
decided by him and those now before this court. 
"The decision of this case turns upon the con-
struction and application of paragraph 3 of the 
contract in evidence which reads as follows: 
" 'First party will at once proceed to procure 
patent to the Cora No. 1 Lode and will after pat-
ent proceedings in land office have been concluded 
and within six months from the date hereof, cause 
to be conveyed to the second party that portion of 
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the said Cora No. 1 Lode lying within the said 
Armstrong Placer.' 
"Whether consideration is given to the con-
tract alone in which the paragraph above quoted 
is found, or whether in connection with the con-
tract consideration is given to the circumstances 
and conditions surrounding the parties and exist-
ing at the time of the making of the contract and 
the matters which occurred subsequent thereto, 
as appears in the record of this case, I am of the 
opinion that the conclusion in respect to the mean-
ing of the contract, as well as in respect to its 
force and effect, must be the same. 
"My conclusions are: 
"(1) That by the contract the plaintiff un-
dertook to procure a good title to the whole of the 
iron lode lying within the conflict area, and to con-
vey this title to the defendant. 
"(2) That under the statute the rule of the 
land office limiting the patented area on the sur-
face to 50 feet in width along the course of the 
vein, does not prevent the patent issued by the 
Government from conveying the entire lode. 
"Under the statute if the locator of a placer 
claim in his application for patent makes mention 
of and claims a known lode, he secures title there-
to under his patent and is required to pay for his 
lode claim at the rate of $5.00 per acre. The area 
of his lode claim to be paid for at this rate being, 
as provided by the statute, 'for such vein or lode 
claim and 25 feet of surface on each side thereof.' 
"Where the placer claimant secures title to a 
lode lying within the limits of his placer claim, I 
do not think, under this statute, there can be any 
doubt that he secures title to the entire lode so 
patented to him, whether it be less or more than 
50 feet in width. 
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"It is an inference in this case that the locator 
of the Armstrong Placer secured title to this iron 
lode within the boundaries of his claim, except the 
135 feet thereof in litigation in this action, and the 
vein which he secured was at least as wide as that 
portion of the vein which for some reason he omit-
ted to mention and claim in his application. No 
one, I believe, will seriously claim that he did not 
secure good title to the entire lode mentioned and 
claimed by him notwithstanding the fact that he 
only paid for a width of 50 feet. 
"I am convinced that it was not the intention 
of Congress by the legislation governing the con-
veyance of title to lodes and veins found within 
placer claims, to provide for the conveyance of less 
than the entire load whether the same was claimed 
by the locator of the placer claim or by a third 
party. Under the statute no different rule should 
be applied in the case of a locator of a known un-
claimed lode within the limits of a placer claim 
than is applied when such known lode is claimed 
by the placer locator in his application for patent, 
and the rule of the land office limiting the surface 
area of the locator to a width of 50 feet along the 
lode and the conveyance to him of such limited 
surface area by patent should not, in view of the 
statute, be held to be a conveyance of less than the 
entire lode, whatever its width might be. 
"In this case whatever difficulty might arise 
by the limitation contained in the patent to a width 
of 50 feet of surface area is overcome by the quit-
claim deed tendered the defendant of the addition-
al surface area described in said deed. 
"At the argument some question was made 
with respect to the segment of the vein covered 
by the application and patent, the claim being that 
it was not upon the apex of the vein, that is, it 
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was claimed that the apex is along and immediate-
ly below the upper line of the out-crop of the lode 
or vein, and that the segment covered by the patent 
is along or upon the edge of the vein. From the 
meager testimony in the case touching that matter 
I am of the opinion that the outcrop of this iron 
ledge is its apex and not an exposure of its edge 
along its dip. But whether the outcrop is one or 
the other is of no importance because in either 
case it is one compact mineralized mass lying be-
tween definite walls, and it is not possible that one 
segment of the vein could be the apex and another 
segment parallel thereto could be upon the edge 
of the vein on its dip. The vein is either all apex 
or all the edge of the vein on its dip. 
"I am of the opinion that the plaintiff has 
substantially complied with its contract and is en-
titled to recover in this action. 
"Judgment will be entered accordingly." 
(Filed August 29, 1918) 
The decree above quoted became final, and pursuant 
to the mandate thereof, and in reliance thereon, Excelsior 
paid the purchase price demanded for the entire lode 
within the conflict area. In addition to receiving deed 
from Colorado Fuel and Iron covering the conflict area, 
Jones and his wife quit-claimed to Excelsior all of their 
right, title and interest in and to the conflict area. (Ex. 
AA p. 23) 
No further challenge was directed against Excelsior's 
title or its right to exclusive possession and ownership of 
the conflict area until April 30, 1949. During that long 
interval respondents and their predecessors in interest 
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continued in the peaceful, unchallenged possession of the 
conflict area, and paid the taxes thereon. 
About 1942 the United States Government became 
interested in the production possibilities of the land here 
involved. The Bureau of Mines made geological exami-
nations and experiments upon the property, including 
trenching and diamond drilling. (Tr. 189, 110, 111) In 
1946 Utah Construction Company succeeded to a lease 
covering the lands here involved. (Ex. P) It entered into 
possession of said property and continued the mining 
and removal of iron ore therefrom. By April 30, 1949, it 
had mined extensively in the conflict area and had so 
far removed ores therefrom that what at one time was 
an outcropping body of ore had become a mining pit 
within which mining operations were being actively car-
ried on. (Tr. 118, Exs. C, D, E, F, G, N; Tr. 200) 
A-5 
APPELLANTS PRETENDED LOCATIONS NOT UPON 
GROUND OPEN TO LOCATION. 
On April 30, 1949, Eobert Gorlinski, still remember-
ing the information he had acquired more than thirty 
years before as an employee and trusted agent of Ex-
celsior, and still clinging to the views rejected by the 
judgment of the federal court, went to a place near the 
property involved for the purpose of making lode loca-
tions thereon. He must have known that Utah Construc-
tion Company was in possession of the property and ac-
tually mining the same. He must have known that it had 
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many men and much heavy equipment upon the property. 
(Tr. 117-127) 
He waited until the day's work had ended and the 
miners had left for the day. He and Justheim then went 
into the pit which had just been vacated by miners of 
respondent and pretended to "discover" an iron ore de-
posit, and pretended to make some lode locations therein. 
(Finding No. 13; Tr. 204, 205, 206, 236) 
The four claims which Gorlinski and Justheim pre-
tended to locate were all within the conflict area. Each is 
approximately 135 feet long north and south, and 50 feet 
wide upon the vein. (Tr. 31) 
A-6 
CASE COVERED BY RULE IN MT. ROSA CASE. 
We have given the foregoing statement in detail for 
the purpose of making it clear that this case is entirely 
controlled by that very limited body of mining law which 
relates to the location of a lode within a prior placer 
claim. Any statute or decision which does not deal with 
a lode location within a prior placer claim is unrelated to 
the issues here under review. 
By his lode location made on the 13th day of January, 
1902, and amended on the 22 day of April, 1902, Jones 
segregated from the public domain the entire lode or vein 
embraced within the boundaries marked off by his loca-
tion. He could not segregate from the public domain the 
surface of the conflict area because the surface rights had 
theretofore been segregated from the public domain and 
appropriated by the Armstrong location. But Jones had 
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segregated the lode and by that segregation he acquired 
the right to 50 feet, and only 50 feet, upon the surface 
of the entire lode to enable him to mine the ore. The effect 
of Judge Marshall's decision, and that of Judge Johnson, 
both referred to above, is that Jones' location entitled him 
to the entire lode, and that the patent gave him the entire 
lode and 50 feet upon the surface. The decisions of Judgv* 
Marshall and Judge Johnson should have set at rest the 
question which has here arisen, and we submit that this 
court should now give effect to those judgments. 
As suggested above, the volume of precedent cover-
ing the point to be decided here is limited. The controlling 
case upon the subject is Mt. Rosa Mining Company v. 
Painter, 56 Pac. 176. That case was decided by the Su-
preme Court of Colorado on February 8,1899. Eeference 
to the Mt. Rosa case as controlling may seem presumptous 
so we take the liberty of discussing the decision at some 
length. Mt. Eosa was the owner of a placer claim which 
had been conveyed to it by United States patent. Palmer 
was the owner of two lode locations laid upon veins or 
lodes within the placer claim after the location and 
patenting of the placer. Palmer brought suit against 
Mt. Rosa to quiet title to his lode claims. He alleged that 
he was the owner of the lode claims to the full extent em-
braced within his locations. Mt. Rosa denied that Palmer 
held any title or ownership within the confines of its 
placer location. The trial court found that the lodes or 
veins covered by Palmer's locations were "known lodes 
or veins" at the time application for placer patent was 
made; that such known lodes or veins were not described 
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in or claimed by the application for placer patent and 
were therefore subject to location by Palmer. The ques-
tion, then, for decision was how much surface should 
Palmer have within the placer claims. The court decided 
that Palmer was entitled to the entire vein or lode covered 
by his location but to only 50 feet of surface width along 
the vein or lode. That decision was, when made, and still 
is the only decision of a court of last resort dealing with 
and deciding the precise point here involved as far as we 
can discover. 
Following the publication of the Mt. Eosa opinion 
the law as there announced was formally adopted by the 
Secretary of the Interior as the correct rule upon the 
subject, and as binding and controlling upon the Land 
Office. 
While Mt. Eosa continues to be the only decision by 
a court of last resort upon the precise point here involved, 
it was interpreted, confirmed and approved in a later case 
in which the Supreme Court of Colorado said in part: 
"In the Mt. Eosa case, however, wherein was 
defined the rights of a placer claimant, we said 
that a placer location gives a qualified possession 
of the ground located; that is to say, it confers up-
on the owner the exclusive right of possession of 
the surface area for all purposes incident to the 
use and operation of the same as a placer mining 
claim, and all unknown lodes or veins, but does not 
give the right of possession to known veins with-
in its limits." Clipper Mining Co. v. Eli M. & L. 
Co., 68 Pac. 286. 
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It will be noted from the foregoing quotation that the 
Colorado Supreme Court recognizes that the placer pat-
ent confers upon the owner the right of possession of the 
surface for placer mining. That right can be invaded 
by the locator of the lode within the placer to the extent 
of only 50 feet. 
The rule established by the Mt. Rosa case was clearly 
recognized by the Supreme Court of Montana in Noyes 
v. Clifford, 94 Pac. 842, 844. Speaking of a vein or lode 
known to exist within a prior placer, the Montana court 
said: 
"If the lode or vein was excepted from the 
terms of the patent, (placer) it, together with 25 
feet on either side of, was open to exploitation 
and location by any citizen of the United States." 
Appellants have brought to light in their exhaustive 
brief no case except the Mt. Rosa case which decided 
the question here presented for review. Judge Lindley 
refers to the Mt. Rosa case as the only one which "an-
nounces a definite solution of the question." 
In Vol. 2, Section 415, beginning at page 969, Lindley 
on Mines, Third Edition, there is a discussion of "width 
of lode locations within placers" which treats extensively 
of the Mt. Rosa case. On page 979 and page 980 of his dis-
cussion of the Mt. Rosa case the author says: 
"The views thus entertained by the supreme 
court of Colorado have recently received the ap-
proval of the secretary of the interior in a com-
munication addressed by him to the attorney-
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general. This communication requested that pro-
ceedings be instituted in behalf of the United 
States to cancel a patent issued for a lode claim 
within a prior located placer, upon the ground, 
among others, that a surface covering a width of 
three hundred feet had been patented, whereas 
the surface width should have been limited to 
twenty-five feet on each side of the center of the 
vein. The secretary calls the attorney-general's 
attention to the views of the department as pre-
viously expressed in the cases heretofore com-
mented on, and then gives his unqualified sanction 
to the doctrine announced by the supreme court 
of Colorado, in the following language: 
" 'This decision, coming from the court of last 
resort of one of the principal mining states, is en-
titled to grave weight, and upon careful consider-
ation of the reasons assigned for the conclusions 
reached, the department is of the opinion that the 
interpretation given the statute in said decision 
is correct.' 
"This opinion was referred to and followed 
by the secretary of the interior in the case of 
Daphne Lode Claim. 
"With this consensus of opinion of the courts 
and the land department the rule may be consider-
ed as practically settled." 
The adoption of the Mt. Eosa rule by the secretary 
of the interior is expressed by the decision of the Land 
office in Daphne Lode Claims, 32 L. D. 513. 
The Mt. Eosa rule was followed by Judge John A. 
Marshall and by Judge Tillman D. Johnson in separate 
cases decided by the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, involving the very land here in dispute. 
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Both judges followed the Mt. Eosa rule and both rejected 
the contentions made here by appellants. 
Interestingly enough, appellants agree with us that 
the Mt. Eosa case applies here. At page 110 of their 
brief they say: "The facts of the instant case bring it 
within the rule of the Mt. Eosa case above cited, and not 
of the Clipper case, supra." 
That the Armstrong placer locations was valid lo-
cation is left beyond dispute by the issuance of the United 
States patent. The Armstrong placer location segregated 
from the public domain the entire surface of the conflict 
area. Jones' location covered the south 135 feet of the 
Armstrong lode or vein in its entire width. 
Under the law above referred to Jones acquired 
title to and ownership of the entire vein and 50 feet in 
width upon the surface without regard to the exact loca-
tion of the apex measured by elevations along the out-
crop. Issuance of the Jones patent raised the conclusive 
presumption: (1) that Jones' location was upon a lode 
or vein known to exist when application for the Arm-
strong placer patent was filed; (2) that the vein or lode 
had an apex; and (3) that the apex lay within the Jones 
location. Those facts were found to be adequate in the 
federal cases involving this same land to sustain judg-
ments confirming title in respondents and rejecting the 
claims here made by appellants. In addition, however, 
the patent to Jones expressly granted to him the entire 
ore body lying within the conflict area. 
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A-7 
JONES' PATENT SPECIFICALLY GRANTED ENTIRE 
LODE. 
Because of the legal requirement that the grant of 
the surface had to be limited to 50 feet in width along the 
vein or lode to preserve as far as possible the placer 
owner's prior right to the surface the language of the 
grant may seem somewhat obscure, but upon analysis of 
the description it becomes clear that while the grant of 
the surface was limited, the grant of the ore body was 
complete. 
It will be remembered that the Cora No. 1 amended 
was so located and described that the north end of it, 
being approximately 135 feet by 600 feet, lay in the South-
west Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 32, 
and was to that extent in conflict with the Armstrong 
Placer. The great bulk of the Cora lay in the Southwest 
Quarter of Section 32. 
The granting clause of the patent first describes the 
Cora No. 1 amended just as located and surveyed, in-
cluding all of that portion lying in the Southwest Quarter 
of the Northwest Quarter of Section 32, and being in con-
flict with the Armstrong Placer. (Tr. 27) If the descrip-
tion had stopped there the grant would have given the en-
tire surface of the conflict area to the Cora without limit-
ation and in disregard of the placer patentee's prior 
surface rights. So, after describing the land granted as 
if it had embraced the conflict area without limitation, 
the patent then excepts from the grant the entire conflict 
area. (Tr. 27) If the description had stopped there Jones, 
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patentee of the Cora, would have been denied all rights 
in or to the ore body lying within the conflict area. But 
because the south 135 feet of the Armstrong lode or 
vein was inadvertently omitted from the Armstrong ap-
plication for patent, Jones had appropriated the ore body 
lying within the conflict area by reason of his lode loca-
tion. So, having first included the entire conflict area 
within land granted by the patent, and having then ex-
cluded the entire conflict area from the land so granted, 
it was necessary to make exceptions from the exception 
in order to grant to Jones that property to which he 
was entitled and no more. The two exceptions saved to 
Jones from the general exception were: (1) Tract A (50 
feet in width upon the surface), and (2) "all veins, lodes 
and ledges throughout their entire depth, the tops or 
apexes of which lay inside of such excluded ground (the 
conflict area)." The language used in the patent is equi-
valent to the government saying: "We are taking the sur-
face of the conflict area out of your claim, but we are 
giving you the ore body and 50 feet upon the surface so 
that you may mine and remove the ore." 
This point can be emphasized if we skeltonize the 
clause of the Jones patent under discussion. After de-
scribing the entire Cora No. 1 as if no conflict existed, and 
as if Jones were entitled to all the area embraced within 
his location without regard to the Armstrong placer, the 
patent provides: 
«# # # expressly excepting and excluding from 
these presents all that portion of the ground, here-
inbefore described, embraced in said mining claim, 
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or lot No. 48 and said southwest quarter of the 
northwest quarter of Section thirty-two except 
Tract A described as follows: Beginning at a 
point on line 8-1 of said Cora No. 1 lode claim west 
281.1 feet from corner No. 8; thence west 50 feet, 
thence south 11°30' west 126.2 feet, thence north 
80° 10' east 50.4 feet, thence north 11°30' east 124.6 
feet to the place of beginning; and also all that 
portion of said Cora No. 1 vein or lode, and of all 
veins, lodes and ledges, throughout their entire 
depth, the tops or apexes of which lie inside of 
such excluded ground." 
If the language just quoted is so far skeletonized as 
to eliminate nonessential language it will read as follows: 
"Expressly excepting and excluding from 
these presents all that portion of the ground here-
inbefore described, embraced * * * in the southwest 
quarter of the northwest quarter of Section 32 
(all of the conflict area) except tract A (the 50, 
feet upon the surface); and also that portion of 
said Cora No. 1 vein or lode, and all veins, lodes 
or ledges throughout the entire depth, the tops or 
apexes of which lie inside of such excluded ground 
(conflict area)." 
The foregoing makes it perfectly clear that what 
Jones received by his patent was the entire lode within 
the conflict area and 50 feet upon the surface. 
A-8 
APPELLANTS' PRETENDED LOCATIONS WERE SUR-
REPTITIOUS AND FRAUDULENT. 
The pretended locations and assessment work relied 
upon by appellants are surreptitious and fraudulent. It 
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is clear from the testimony of Gorlinski and Justheim 
that Gorlinski induced Justheim to endeavor to make 
lode locations in the middle of respondent's mining opera-
tions. (Tr. 235) There is some suggestion in Gorlinski's 
testimony that he became acquainted with the area here 
involved as long ago as 1902. (Tr. 261, 262) If he did 
so he gained his knowledge as the agent and employee of 
Excelsior. 
It will be remembered that in 1902 the patent cover-
ing the Armstrong Placer and the Armstrong Iron Mine, 
Lot 41, was twenty-three years old. From 1879 until 
1902 the patentee of the Armstrong claims and their 
successors in interest believed that the Armstrong Mine, 
Lot 41, embraced the entire outcropping lode to the south 
boundary of the quarter section. If it did not, any omis-
sion was due to inadvertence in the survey approved by 
the Surveyor General in 1879. In 1902 Jones located the 
Cora and first raised the claim which created the conflict 
between the Cora and the Armstrong locations. Shortly 
thereafter Excelsior brought its first suit in equity to 
quiet title against Jones and his Cora location. Gorlinski 
may have become familiar with the matter at that time 
as an agent and employee of Excelsior. If he did he then 
knew that the court adjudged Jones to be the owner of 
the entire conflict area by reason of the Cora location. 
There is no doubt that Gorlinski knew about the 
issuance of the Jones patent in 1912, and about the dis-
pute between Excelsior and Jones as to what was con-
veyed by the patent. (Tr. 264, 273) It was Gorlinski who 
testified in the case before Judge Tillman D. Johnson that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
the Jones patent did not convey the ore body lying in the 
conflict area except in so far as the ore body lay beneath 
the 50 foot strip known as Tract A. In that case, as in 
this case, Gorlinski testified that the conflict area, except 
for Tract A, was open to location. (Tr. 273) As long ago 
as 1918 Gorlinski knew that the United States court had 
rejected his contentions. He knew that his client had been 
ordered to and did pay for the entire ore body lying with-
in the conflict area in compliance with, and in reliance 
upon, the judgment of the federal court; that the Jones 
patent divested the government of any remaining title 
to the ore body within the conflict area and vested such 
title in Jones. Gorlinski knew that his client, Excelsior, 
having so paid for the ore body continued to hold the 
same under claim of right. And Gorlinski acquired all 
of his information as a confidential employee of Excel-
sior. 
Gorlinski knew as early as 1944 that a road was 
being projected into the area to facilitate the mining of 
the ore body here involved. He learned that while on a 
trip to the property as an employee of Senter F. Walker, 
who was then lessee of the area and predecessor of Utah 
Construction Company. (Tr. 274). 
On April 30,1949, Gorlinski and Justheim must have 
known that Utah Construction Company, as lessee of 
Excelsior, was, and for a long time had been, actually 
and under claim of title engaged in mining the ore body 
here involved. They must have known that many men 
and elaborate machinery and equipment had been so 
persistently engaged in mining the area as to reduce the 
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former outcrop to a pit. They must have known that a 
good and serviceable access road had been built to the 
area to accommodate the movement of heavy equipment 
and ore trucks. They knew that an automobile could be 
driven easily and quickly to and across the area here in-
volved. 
Gorlinski and Jones did not arrive at the area in any 
such way. They took a little used road which led to a 
point south and down a long slope from the conflict area. 
There they waited until the day's work upon the property 
had ended. When the trucks had driven away and the 
mining machines were quiet, and the miners had been 
taken away in the buses, Gorlinski and Justheim climbed 
the long hill to the very spot just vacated by respondent's 
miners. (Finding 13, Tr. 204, 205, 206, 236) They thought 
they had come just when they would have the place all to 
themselves—after the occupants had gone and there was 
still enough time before dark to "discover" a mine and 
stake claims upon it. Only a last pecautionary glance by 
the powder foreman before igniting the charges saved 
Gorlinski and Justheim from being blasted to eternity. 
(Tr. 204 to 206) The last thing the miners did before 
leaving the pit was to make the electrical connections 
necessary to explode the charges which had been put into 
the iron ore. It was the purpose of the powder foreman 
to await the departure of all persons from the pit and 
then close the switch which would produce the desired 
explosion. He was in a position of safety at the blast 
house far removed from the pit, and just as he was about 
to close the switch he saw a hat approaching the edge of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
the pit. He warned Gorlinski and Justheim away from 
the place of danger, and after touching off the blast he 
left the premises. No wonder Justheim and Gorlinski 
called their pretended claim the "Lucky." 
Justheim and Gorlinski hung around until after the 
blast and then went into the pit amidst the broken ore 
left by the explosion. There they pretended to "dis-
cover" four separate claims. (Tr. 127) 
The same knowledge which brought Gorlinski to the 
property with Justheim on April 20, 1949, had been his 
for between forty and fifty years, and yet he waited to 
"jump" these claims until he knew that mining upon the 
spot had about reached its maximum. The conclusion 
is almost irresistible that Gorlinski waited for the time 
when he thought his interference would have the greatest 
possible nuisance value. 
The sham did not stop with the pretended discovery 
of a mine and the staking of claims. If Gorlinski and 
Justheim were to keep up the pretense they must do the 
"annual assessment work" in 1950 and 1951. The law re-
quires that to maintain a location there must be done 
annually upon each claim $100.00 worth of work and labor 
for the benefit of the claim. (Sec, 28, Title 30 U.S.C.A.) 
Did they do or cause any work to be done for the benefit 
of the claims? The record shows that respondents had 
built an access road across the south end of the area 
here involved so that mining could be carried on. The 
road was built by piling up rock which was broken down 
by mining operations and then surfacing the top of the 
rock so piled for the smooth passage of vehicles. Mining 
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was then carried on between the roadway and the escarp-
ment to the north. The area between the roadway and the 
escarpment was the mining pit of respondents, and it was 
within that pit that appellants discovered the mine and 
laid their claims. (Tr. 127) The annual assessment done 
by appellants in 1950 and 51 "for the benefit of the prop-
erty" consisted solely in breaking down the north side of 
the access road and throwing the material back into the 
pit. (Tr. 277, 278, 135) That such work was not for the 
benefit of the property but in actual deterioration there-
of seems clear. 
An examination of the pleadings will disclose that-
appellant, Gorlinski, claims an interest in the locations 
made by him in the name of Justheim. The complaint 
charges that Gorlinski claims an interest in the locations 
here involved. Gorlinski did not file a disclaimer but ad-
mitted the truth of the allegation that he claimed an in-
terest. He is here appealing from the decree of Judge 
Hoyt. We call these matters to the court's attention be-
cause the law prohibits a Deputy United States Mineral 
Surveyor from having any interest in a mineral location. 
The record shows that Gorlinski has been a deputy min-
eral surveyor for approximately 60 years. (Tr. 260) 
He took Justheim with him to the property involved and 
led him to respondents' mining pit and suggested that lo-
cations be made therein. He was a deputy mineral sur-
veyor during the years of his connection with the prop-
erty involved, and was a deputy mineral surveyor the 
day he did the work in the name of Justheim. A location 
in which a deputy mineral surveyor has an interest is 
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void. This point was considered and decided in Waskey v. 
Hammer, 223 U. S. 85, 56 L. Ed. 359. In the course of its 
opinion the Supreme Court of the United States said: 
"They are required to take an oath, and to 
execute a bond to the United States, as are many 
public officer. Within the limits of their auth-
ority they act in the stead of the surveyor gen-
eral and under his direction, and in that sense are 
his deputies. The work which they do is the work 
of the government, and the surveys which they 
make are its surveys. The right performance of 
their duties is of real concern, not merely to those 
at whose solicitation they act, but also the own-
ers of adjacent and conflicting claims and to the 
government. Of the representatives of the gov-
ernment who have to do with the proceedings 
incident to applications for patents to mining 
claims, they alone come in contact with the land 
itself^ and have an opportunity to observe its 
situation and character, and the extent and nature 
of the work done and improvements made thereon; 
and it is upon their reports that the surveyor 
general makes the certificate required by Eev0 
Stat. Sec, 2325, which is a prerequisite to the 
issuance of a patent. * * * The purpose of the 
prohibition is to guard against the temptations 
and partiality likely to attend efforts to acquire 
public lands, or interests therein, by persons so 
situated, and thereby to prevent abuse and inspire 
confidence in the administration of the public-land 
laws. So understanding the letter and purpose 
of the prohibition, we think it embraces the loca-
tion of a mining claim by a mineral surveyor." 
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To the same effect is the Utah case of Lavagnino v. 
UMig, 26 Utah 1, 71 Pac. 1046, 198 U.S. 444, 49 L. Ed. 
1119. 
The foregoing should be sufficient to demonstrate 
that respondents are entitled to a judgment affirming 
Judge Hoyt's order quieting title to the lode or vein in 
dispute in respondents. It is our purpose to discuss in 
the following pages the points presented by appellants 




Material presented under their Point I suggests 
that appellants feel under the necessity of establishing 
the existence of the "conflict area." There can be no 
doubt of the existence of the conflict area. The Arm-
strong patent conveyed to the patentees all of the surface 
of the quarter section involved but omitted the south 
135 feet of the Armstrong vein or lode. That error 
raised the question as to who owned that portion of the 
Jones location lying within the conflict area. Three 
separate judgments of the United States court confirmed 
title in Jones to all the ore lying within the conflict area 
with 50 feet of the surface carved out of the Armstrong 
placer. 
B-2—POINT II. 
Under Point II appellants assert that the quit-claim 
deed by Jones and wife conveyed to respondents' pre-
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decessor only such right, title and interest as Jones and 
wife possessed at the date of the conveyance. It is with-
out dispute that prior to the date of the deed by Jones 
and wife to respondents' predecessor in interest it had 
been finally adjudicated by the United States Court 
that the Jones patent conveyed the entire lode within 
the conflict area to Jones. It is also without dispute that 
respondents are presently the owners of all title ever 
owned by Jones and wife, or ever conveyed to Jones 
by the United States patent (Tr. 26, 28, 29). 
In summarizing the litigation involving the conflict 
area appellants argue that no decree ever quieted title 
to the area in Excelsior and against Jones. They admit, 
however, that two equity decrees of the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah quieted title to 
the area in Jones, and they further admit that respond-
ents presently own all of the rights ever acquired by 
Jones. 
On page 32 of their brief appellants argue thai 
because law action 3044, pending in the United States 
District Court before Judge Tillman D. Johnson, was 
an action at law based upon a contract nothing germane 
to the issue now before this court was decided. A read-
ing of Judge Johnson's judgment and decree (page 14 
above), will disclose that appellants' argument upon 
the point is without merit. A judgment against Excelsior 
and in favor of Colorado Fuel and Iron, as successor in 
interest to Jones, could have been supported only by a 
finding that the Jones patent conveyed to Jones all of 
the iron ore in the conflict area, and that Jones thereby 
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became the owner of the ore with the right to sell the 
same. Upon cross-examination in this case, Gorlinski 
admitted that the claims and contentions made by him 
in this case are the same as those made by him before 
Judge Johnson (Tr. 273). 
In their brief at page 32, appellants say: 
"The decree in the Circuit Court of the 
United States for the District of Utah, in Equity 
Action No. 522, entitled 'Excelsior Iron Mining 
Company vs. Thomas J. Jones,' (Plaintiffs' Ex-
hibit 'T') specifically quieted title in Thomas J . 
Jones in and to the 'conflict area.' In the action 
instituted and prosecuted in the Circuit Court 
of the United States District Court for the District 
of Utah by Excelsior Iron Mining Company vs. 
Thomas J. Jones, being Equity Action No. 1053 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 'U') , although based upon 
stipulation of counsel (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 'S ' ) r 
nevertheless quieted title in Thomas J. Jones in 
the 'conflict a rea . ' " 
The foregoing is an admission of interesting facts 
which are beyond dispute. I t is noted that in both of 
those cases title was quieted in Jones as to the entire 
"conflict area," including all of the surface rights as 
well as all of the ore lying upon or beneath the surface. 
Those decrees gave Jones the full advantage of the error 
made in the metes and bounds description of the Arm-
strong Lode, and proceeded upon the theory that Jones ' 
location upon the "conflict area" was a valid location, 
which had the effect of fully severing from the public 
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domain all of the land embraced within the "conflict 
area." 
B-3—POINT III. 
Under Point III appellants contend that the Jones 
patent excluded from the lands granted all the conflict 
area including the lode or vein lying therein except 
Tract A. In view of the three adjudications of this 
precise point by the United States District Court, for the 
District of Utah, and in view of what has been said upon 
the subject hereinbefore, we will not further labor the 
point. 
In the closing portion of their argument under 
Point III of their brief beginning on page 35, appellants 
charge that in the case before Judge Johnson respond-
ents' predecessor in interest "took the solemn legal 
position in the United States Court that the patent to 
Jones excluded the 'conflict area' except Tract A." Our 
predecessor did take that position. It took that position 
upon the advice of Gorlinski, and it presented it to the 
court through Gorlinski as a witness. The United States 
Court "solemnly" adjudged and decreed that the posi-
tion of our predecessor in interest was wrong and the 
Gorlinski views and opinions must be rejected. The 
judgment and decree so entered became final and bind-
ing upon our predecessors in interest and all of its 
successors. Counsel for appellants seem to think it 
strange that our predecessors, and we as successors in 
interest, should feel bound by a final judgment of the 
United States Court. By his testimony in this case it is 
made clear that Gorlinski disagreed with the judgment 
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of the United States Court and has therefore elected 
to ignore it. 
B-4—POINT IV. 
Appellants' Point IV is devoted to an argument that 
the field notes, Exhibit B and C, to Stipulation (Tr. 34, 
42) which were received in evidence subject to respond-
ents' objection, were properly received in evidence. It 
seems so clear upon the facts and the applicable law that 
the entire ore body lying within the conflict area now 
belongs to respondents that we do not care to obscure the 
matter by extended argument upon non-essential points. 
At the time of the trial respondents urged, and here urge, 
that the field notes were not admissible. If field notes are 
referred to in a patent for the purpose of supplying a 
description, then they are admissible as a part of the 
patent. If they are referred to in the patent only in 
connection with recitals setting forth that field notes 
were made, then they were inadmissible. Both of the 
patents involved in this litigation contain descriptions 
complete in themselves and no reference is made to 
field notes for the purpose of further detailing descrip-
tions. 
In the Jones patent it is simply recited that, "In 
pursuance of the provisions of the Kevised Statutes of 
the United States, Chapter 6, Title 32, and Legislation 
Supplemental thereto, there has been deposited in the 
General Land Office of the United States the Plat and 
Field Notes of Survey and the Certificate of the Eegis-
ter of the Land Office at Salt Lake City, Utah, accom-
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panied by other evidence whereby it appears that 
Thomas J. Jones did, on September 21, 1910, duly enter 
and pay for that certain mining claim," etc. The fore-
going is simply a recital of antecedent facts and does 
not leave any of the description set forth in the patent 
to be supplemented by the Field Notes. 
The Armstrong patent makes no reference to the 
Field Notes. 
In Lindley on Mines, Vol. 3, Third Edition, Sec. 778, 
page 1894, it is said: 
"It may be announced as a general rule that 
a patent is conclusive evidence as to the limits 
of a location, and that it cannot be assailed by 
showing that its actual boundaries were different 
from those described in the patent. 
"Nor are the proceedings on which its issu-
ance was based admissible in evidence to impeach 
or vary it." 
B-5—POINT V. 
Point V of appellants' brief covers 51 pages. It is 
devoted to a labored effort to give some special and 
unique character to the ore body involved which will 
deprive respondents of the benefits of their ancient 
discoveries, and allow appellants to enjoy the fruits of 
such discoveries. 
In Point V appellants ignore the controlling fact 
that we are here concerned with a lode claim within 
a prior placer. 
Findings 10, 11 and 19 made by the court below 
describe generally the ore body here involved. No. 10 
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describes it by surface dimensions and finds that its 
surface embraces the surface area of Tract "A" and the 
four Lucky claims. 
Finding 11 finds that the ore body is "a body of 
iron bearing rock in place embedded in a trough-like 
depression with its walls converging as they descend. 
Finding 19 is: uThe lode or vein lying within the 
Armstrong Iron Mine, Lot No. 41, and within the conflict 
area, including the four Lucky claims and 'Tract A/ 
is a single indivisible lode or body of ore, and the dis-
covery within Tract A lies upon the apex of said lode 
or vein." 
The foregoing findings are fully supported by the 
evidence and compel the conclusion that appellants are 
without any right or interest in or to any part of the 
conflict area. 
There is nothing obscure about the ore body here 
involved. The truth about it has been laid bare by in-
spection, prospective drilling and actual mining. What 
is apparent today tells the trained geologist what was 
likely there ages ago. Iron bearing fluids penetrated 
the calcareous sandstone and molecule by molecule the 
calcareous sandstone was replaced by iron. The result 
was a vast lense of homogeneous iron ore lying between 
the pinto sandstone on one side and the pinto sandstone 
or monzonite on the other. To what elevation the forma-
tion thus created reached in prehistoric times no one 
can say. Certainly it is not a blanket or horizontal bed 
now, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that 
it ever was such. 
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Erosion began to work and as the ages passed the 
formation was worn off^$ecause the sandstone and mon-
zonite was softer than the iron ore (magnatite) the 
walls eroded faster than the iron ore leaving the iron 
to protrude or outcrop above the country rock. What 
remained by the time first involved here was what both 
geologists, Christensen and Hansen, described as the 
roots of the original deposit—a truncated V with iron 
ore still occupying the remainder of the V (Tr. 162, 
163). 
The ore body varies in some respects from the veins 
or lodes often encountered in this area, but that it con-
stitutes a vein or lode cannot be doubted. The issuance 
by the United States of patents in recognition and con-
firmation of lode locations made upon the ore body 
forecloses any argument now that the ore body is not 
a vein or lode, or that it is without an apex. 
The ore body bears no relationship to the horizontal 
or blanket lodes referred to in the books and typified 
by the Leadville formations. Horizontal or blanket lodes 
have identifying characteristics. They lie upon and 
below contacting sedimentaries which are in turn hori-
zontal and which are parallel to each other and to the 
intervening vein or bed. The ore body here involved 
has none of the characteristics of the blanket vein. It 
is not a plane in the geometric sense (Tr. 172). It has 
no contact with any horizontal sedimentary above, and 
there is no evidence to support any inference that there 
ever was any such contact. Its long axis may be and 
was referred to by the expert witnesses as its strike, 
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but it does not have a true dip because of its close and 
narrow confinement by the converging walls of the coun-
try rock (Tr. 172). 
The Armstrong and Jones locations, and the issu-
ance of patents based thereon, have given rise to cer-
tain conclusive presumptions which fully meet the con-
tentions of appellants. It is necessary to review certain 
aspects of those locations. 
Locations upon the Armstrong Placer and upon the 
Armstrong Lode were made by Blair, Smith and Adams 
on the 4th day of October, 1871. It was Blair, Smith 
and Adams in 1871, and not Gorlinski and Justheim 
in 1949, who discovered the iron mine. Patent was issued 
upon the Armstrong Placer and the Armstrong Lode 
on the 16th day of December, 1879. The issuance of the 
patent upon the Armstrong Lode raised the conclusive 
presumption that all things necessary to a valid loca-
tion, including the discovery of ore upon the apex of the 
vein and all other things prerequisite to the issuance 
of a patent, had been lawfully done. Except for an in-
advertent error in the survey of 1879 patent would have 
vested title in Walker and Blair as successors of the 
Armstrong locations to all the ore in the conflict area. 
Jones made his location of the Cora No. 1 in 1902. 
The boundaries marked off upon the land and described 
by Jones in his location of the Cora included the conflict 
area. The effect of Jones' location was to detach from 
the public domain all the area embraced within his 
boundaries except such as had already been covered 
by prior valid location or patents. Again it was Jones 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
43 
in 1902, and not Gorlinski or Justheim in 1949, who dis-
covered iron in the Cora. A valid mineral location gives 
to the locator the equivalent of fee simple title to the 
land described against all the world but the government, 
and it gives to the locator a right to patent which the 
government itself cannot deny or avoid if the locator 
maintains his location in good standing and does all the 
things required by the law as prerequisite to patent. 
The mining laws in 1902 gave any locator who made 
a "discovery" the right to locate and acquire a claim 
up to 1500 feet in length along the vein and up to 600 
feet in width, subject to the provision that if the lode 
location be upon a lode or vein known to exist within 
a prior placer location, the width of the location upon 
the surface shall be limited to 50 feet. 
Jones located upon approximately 135 feet in length 
and 600 feet in width upon the Armstrong Lode or vein 
(Ex. AA, pp. 13, 14). By that location he acquired 
all of the surface and all of the minerals within the 
conflict area not theretofore lost to the government upon 
issuance of the Armstrong patent. 
Acting upon Jones' application for patent the land 
office determined that the surface of the conflict area 
was covered by the Armstrong Placer patent and that 
Jones was therefore entitled to only 50 feet upon the 
surface of the placer claim. It therefore excluded from 
the patent all of the surface except 50 feet which was 
deemed sufficient to permit the mining of the entire lode 
embraced within the conflict area. 
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This court has been required to consider the mining 
laws of the land in numerous cases, and at least two 
of its decisions are of special significance here. 
Bullion Beck and Champion Mining Co. v. Eureka 
Hill Mining Company} 5 Utah 3,11 Pac. 515, was decided 
by this court in July of 1886. It thereafter became one 
of the celebrated mining cases of the west. 
The following excerpts are pertinent: 
"The act.of 1872 is entitled 'An Act to pro-
mote the development of the mineral resources of 
the United States.' Its first section declares all 
valuable mineral deposits of the public domain 
to be free and open to exploration, etc. The second 
section forbids a location without a discovery of 
a vein or lode. # # * These mining laws unmis-
takably discover an intention to favor and reward 
diligent discoverers and developers of mines. 
Letters patent protect the man who invents a new 
machine for the application of the forces of nature 
to the uses of man, for the reason that his intel-
ligence, his labor, and his enterprise have con-
ferred a benefit upon society. The public good, 
as well as justice, demands that the inventor 
should be encouraged. So the prospector who 
climbs the mountains, and digs and toils, and dis-
covers a valuable mine, ought to be protected, 
encouraged, and rewarded for his enterprise, his 
toil, and his skill. This, it is believed, the public 
good, as well as justice, demands, and justice and 
the public good are the chief ends of this law. 
* * * While this section limits the right of a 
person to a lode longitudinally, it does not limit 
such right in the direction of the width of the 
lode. The right as to the width of the surface 
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ground is limited, but not the right as to the width 
of the vein. * * * By complying with the law the 
first discoverer takes it all as the reward for his 
diligence and enterprise; and this would be so 
notwithstanding that the united lode might be 
under the surface ground of the junior claim. * # # 
"The law contemplated its (the vein) segre-
gation in its length, not in its width. I t refers to 
lodes between the end lines, not to a par t of a lode. 
No expression can be found in it indicating an 
intention to limit the rights of the locator to a 
portion of the lode in its width. The discovery of 
any part of the apex of a vein is regarded by it 
as a discovery of the entire apex. And we think 
that the law of 1872, when all of its provisions 
are considered together, and in connection with 
the former law on the subject, as it should be, 
evinces the same extent. Under this law the dis-
coverer of any part of the apex gets the right to 
its entire width, despite the fact that a portion 
of the width may be outside of the surface side 
lines of his claim extended downwards vertically. 
While he has no right to the extra lateral surface, 
he has a right to the extra lateral lode beneath 
the surface." (Italics ours). 
While Bullion Beck v. Champion does not deal with 
a lode claim within a prior placer, it is controlling auth-
ority for the proposition that Jones, having located 
upon the ore body within the "conflict area" is entitled 
to the whole ore body unlimited in width and limited in 
length to approximately 135 feet. I t also shows the dis-
position of the court to reward those who "discover" 
mines and spend their talents and their funds in develop-
ing them as against those who later attempt to take 
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advantage of the early discovery and diligent operation. 
It is difficult to conceive of a claim having less equity 
than that here asserted by Gorlinski and Justheim. 
Another celebrated decision of this court is Grand 
Central Mining Co. v. Mammoth Mining Company, 83 
Pac. 648, 29 Utah 490. It contains the following signi-
ficant and controlling statement: 
"We concede, as claimed by appellant, that 
a patent to a mining claim raises a conclusive 
presumption that there is the apex of a vein with-
in the patented ground (1 Lindley on Mines, Sec. 
305)." 
This rule announced by this court is in harmony 
with the law of the land and is a conclusive answer to the 
argument of counsel that the ore body involved was and 
is without apex. 
In Section 305 of Vol. 1 of Lmdley on Mines, Third 
Ed., p. 676, referred to by this court in the case next above 
cited, there is this statement: 
"(1) No lode location is valid unless it in-
cludes, to some extent at least, within vertical 
planes drawn through the surface boundaries, the 
top, or apex, of a discovered vein at least as 
against a subsequent locator properly inclosing 
such apex within his surface boundaries." 
In Vol. 3, Lindley on Mines, Third Edition, Sec. 780, 
p. 1899, this appears: 
"The issuance of a lode patent conclusively 
presumes the existence within its boundaries of 
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an apex, as this is a fact necessary to support its 
validity. But it will not be presumed that this 
apex takes any particular direction or extends for 
any definite length." 
The issuance to Jones of his patent raised the con-
clusive presumption that there was an apex upon the ore 
body, and that it lay within Tract "A." An interesting 
statement of the point is found in Snyder on Mines, 
Section 796, which reads as follows: 
"The Courts have applied many definitions, 
some differing from others, but generally they 
reach the conclusion that the apex means the 
beginning or edge of the vein or lode; that portion 
which approaches nearest the surface of the earth. 
It is sometimes synonymous with the word 'out-
crop' and where the edge or beginning of the vein 
comes to the surface on the strike thereof, it is 
correctly so used." 
Farther on in the section Snyder points out that 
what is meant by the apex is that part of the strike of 
the vein which forms its outer edge, the edge nearest 
the surface of the earth, "whether it be in fact its high-
est point or not." 
In Section 799 of Snyder, this language appears: 
"In all such cases the apex means the entire 
top of the vein or ore matter between the boun-
daries, bounding planes or walls as the case may 
be. For it is said to be sufficient to give the right 
to pursue such vein or ore body on its downward 
course, that its surface exposure or apex as here-
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in defined never wholly departs from the vertical 
bounding planes of the location." 
One of the most interesting mining cases in all the 
books arose in Salt Lake County and was finally decided 
by the Supreme Court of the United States. Lawson v. 
U.S. Mining Co., 207 U.S. 5, 52 L. Ed. 65. In the course 
of his opinion for the court Mr. Justice Brewer said: 
"Treating this limestone as a single broad 
vein, it is apparent that the entire apex is not 
within the surface of either the Kempton or Ash-
land, but that it is also found in the Old Jordan 
and Mountain Gem, — the properties of the plain-
tiff. The lime which divides the surface of the 
claims of the defendants from the Old Jordan 
and Mountain Gem claims also bisects the vein 
as it comes to the surface. In other words, part 
of the apex is within plaintiff's claims and part 
within defendants'. In such a case the senior loca-
tion takes the entire width of the vein on its dip. 
This was the conclusion of the court of appeals, 
as shown by this quotation from its opinion (p. 
592): 
"Where two or more mining claims longi-
tudinally bisect or divide the apex of a vein, the 
senior claim takes the entire width of the vein 
on its dip, if it is in other respects so located as 
to give a right to pursue the vein downward out-
side of the side lines. This is so because it has 
been the custom among miners, since before the 
enactment of the mining laws, to regard and treat 
the vein as a unit and indivisible, in point of width, 
as respects the right to pursue it extralaterally 
beneath the surface; because usually the width 
of the vein is so irregular, and its strike and dip 
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depart so far from right lines, that it is altogether 
impracticable, if not impossible, to continue the 
longitudinal bisection at the apex throughout the 
vein on its dip or downward course; and because 
it conforms to the principle pervading the mining 
laws, that priority of discovery and of location 
gives the better right, as illustrated in the pro-
vision giving to the senior claim all ore contained 
in the space of intersection where two or more 
veins intersect or cross each other, and in the 
further provision giving to the senior claim the 
entire vein at and below the point of union, where 
two or more veins with distinct apices and em-
braced in separate claims unite in their course 
downward. Eev. Stat. Sec. 2336, U.S. Comp. Stat. 
1901, p. 1436.' 
"We fully indorse the views thus expressed. 
Discovery is the all-important fact upon which 
title to mines depends. Lindley, in his work on 
Mines, 2d ed. vol. 1, Sec. 335, says : 
" 'Discovery in all ages and all countries has 
been regarded as conferring rights or claims to 
reward. Gamboa, who represented the general 
thought of his age on this subject, was of the 
opinion that the discoverer of mines was even 
more worthy of reward than the inventor of a 
useful art. Hence, in the mining laws of all civ-
ilized countries, the great consideration for grant-
ing mines to individuals is discovery. "Rewards 
so bestowed," says Gamboa, "besides being a 
proper return for the labor and anxiety of the 
discoverers, have the further effect of stimulating 
others to search for veins and mines, on which 
the general prosperity of the state depends." ' 
"The two thoughts here presented are reward 
for the time and labor spent in making the dis-
covery, thus adding to the general wealth, and 
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incentive to others to prosecute searches for veins 
and mines. To take from the discoverer a portion 
of that which he has discovered and give it to 
one who may have been lead to make an adjoining 
location by a knowledge of the discovery, and 
without any previous searching for mineral, is 
manifest injustice." * * * 
"In Bullion, B. & C. Min. Co. v. Eureka Hill 
Min. Co., 5 Utah 3, 11 Pae. 515, the question is 
discussed at some length by Chief Justice Zane. 
In the course of the opinion it is said (p. 54): 
" 'Under the law of 1866 the surface ground 
was merely for the convenient working of the lode. 
The discoverer and first locator took the lode in 
its entirety. The law contemplated its segregation 
in its length, not in its width. It refers to lodes 
between the end lines not to a part of a lode. 
No expression can be found in it indicating an 
intention to limit the rights of the locator to a 
portion of the lode in its width. The discovery 
of any part of the apex of a vein is regarded by 
it as a discovery of the entire apex. And we think 
that the law of 1872, when all of its provisions 
are considered together, and in connection with 
the former law on the subject, as it should be, 
evinces the same intent. Under this law the dis-
coverer of any part of the apex gets the right 
* to its entire width, despite the fact that a portion 
of the width may be outside of the surface side 
lines of his claim extended downwards vertically. 
While he has no right to the extralateral surface, 
he has a right to the extralateral lode beneath 
the surface.'" 
We have read all of the decisions cited by appellants 
in support of the argument made under Point V. In 
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developing and pursuing their arguments appellants over-
look and ignore the controlling fact that we are here 
concerned with the location of a lode within a prior 
placer. Typical of the cases relied upon by appellants 
is State v. District Court, 25 Mont. 504, 65 Pac. 1020. 
Eeliance is had upon that case by appellants because 
within the course of its opinion the Montana court says: 
"A discovery of a vein upon unoccupied land 
is absolutely essential to the validity of a loca-
tion." 
The quoted statement has no application to the loca-
tion upon a known lode or vein within a prior placer. 
If it did then neither Jones nor appellants nor anyone 
else could ever have made any valid location within the 
conflict area because the entire conflict area was "occu-
pied" by the Armstrong placer. 
While Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Mike and Starr Gold 
and Silver Mining Co., 143 U.S. 394, 36 L. Ed. 20, refers 
to a lode within a placer, it decides only that a jury in 
the trial court was justified upon conflicting evidence 
in finding that a lode was known to exist within the 
placer claim at the time of application for the placer. 
B-6—POINT VI. 
Appellants' Point VI is stated in this language : 
"THE PATENT ISSUED TO WALKER AND BLAIR 
COVERING THE ARMSTRONG PLACER CLAIM AND THE 
ARMSTRONG 'IRON MINE' INCLUDED NO PART OF THE 
MINERAL DEPOSIT, EXCLUDING PLACER RIGHTS, SIT-
UATE IN THE 'CONFLICT AREA/ " 
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The foregoing correctly states that the patent issued 
to Walker and Blair included and conveyed the surface 
of the conflict area as placer ground. Otherwise the 
statement is incorrect. We have presented respondents' 
position and argued the case upon the theory that an 
error in the application for the Armstrong patent left 
the south 135 feet of the iron lode subject to appro-
priation and location notwithstanding there was no 
unoccupied surface within the conflict area. The federal 
court has three times held that because of the error in 
description in the application for the Armstrong patent 
the lode within the conflict area was open to location, 
and it three times held that such lode was appropriated 
by the Jones location. 
B-7—POINT VII. 
Point VII is an effort by appellants to explain and 
excuse the stealthy and surreptitious entry upon the con-
flict area by Grorlinski and Justheim for the purpose of 
discovering and locating claims thereon. We have here-
tofore discussed in some detail Grorlinski's long con-
nection with the area involved and the clandestine man-
ner in which he and Justheim endeavored to "jump" the 
claims involved. 
This court has had occasion to consider conduct simi-
lar in quality to that of Justheim and Gorlinski. The 
question was presented to this court in Springer v. 
Southern Pacific Co., 67 Utah 590, 248 Pac. 819. The 
mineral involved in the Springer case was limerock lying 
in clifts and ledges on the west side of Great Salt Lake. 
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Under the law it was subject to location only as placer 
ground, but about 1904 it was erroneously located by 
Southern Pacific's predecessor in interest by lode loca-
tions. Thereafter for many years Southern Pacific occu-
pied, possessed and extensively worked the deposits 
embraced within the lode locations. Springer knew of 
the possession and occupancy of Southern Pacific and of 
the extensive mining operations carried on. He also 
knew that the property had been erroneously covered 
by lode locations. Those representing him went upon 
the land in the very early hours of the morning before 
the miners and their equipment arrived and pretended 
to stake out placer claims which covered the very pit 
in which Southern Pacific was mining. It was ruled by 
this court that no rights were acquired by the pretended 
locations. This court relied chiefly upon the statute of 
limitations to support its decision, but it had the follow-
ing pertinent comments to make: 
"In this connection it should also be remem-
bered that the court found (and we think the 
evidence supports the finding) that the appellants 
'early in the morning of said day (the day the 
location was made), long before working hours 
and either before or about daylight, clandestinely 
and surreptitiously entered upon and invaded the 
actual possession of said claims # * * and at-
tempted to locate a portion thereof by embrac-
ing the same within an association placer mining 
location, called the "Barney Google" placer min-
ing claim. * * *9 Had the appellants entered upon 
said claims with force and arms, no one would, 
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we think, contend that they could acquire any 
rights in or to the mineral lands as against another 
in actual possession thereof and working the 
ground under an attempted location. What one 
may not do by force he likewise may not accom-
plish surreptitiously or by stealth. That such is 
the law applicable to the location of mining claims 
is too well settled to require the citation of auth-
orities." 
One needs only to read the foregoing to be impressed 
by the close parallel between the methods employed by 
Springer and those by Gorlinski and Justheim. 
CONCLUSION 
The written stipulation made and filed by the parties 
(Tr. 22 et. seq.) contains the agreement that respondent. 
Excelsior Iron Mining Company, is the owner of all the 
rights conveyed by the Armstrong and Jones patents. 
The combined effect of the locations upon which those 
patents were based was to segregate the entire conflict 
area, including all of the iron lode therein, from the pub-
lic domain. The effect of the patents was to vest the 
entire conflict area in respondents' predecessors in inter-
est. The District Court of the United States has so 
adjudged. It would be a strange and disquieting result 
if after more than 30 years of reliance upon the final 
judgment of the United States Court the rights of re-
spondents shall now be destroyed by a judgment of the 
state court. 
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In Waskey v. Hammer, supra, the Supreme Court of 
the United States made the point that after a ruling of 
the Land Office had been relied upon for 25 years it 
would be unwise to change the rule. 
No part of the Armstrong lode within the conflict 
area, and no part of the surface of the area, was public 
domain and open to location when appellants made their 
pretended locations of the Lucky claims. Appellants are 
without right and title to the area for the further reasons: 
(1) That their entry upon the land was stealthy and 
fraudulent; and, 
(2) Kobert Grorlinski was at the time Deputy United 
States Mineral Surveyor claiming an interest in the 
locations. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KAY, RAWLINS, JONES & 
HENDERSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellee, 
Excelsior Iron Mining Co. 
KAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellee, 
Utah Construction Company 
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